Trying to analyze the unjust war my country started will always be difficult; there’s a thin line between being analytical and being desensitized to the horror Russia has wreaked. Still, I’ve lost much sleep following events in minute detail, and I’d like to share the lessons I’ve drawn so far — with a necessary caveat. Being Russian, and having initially underestimated the madness that drove Putin to invade, I cannot make authoritative judgments.
1. Watch the Russian ultranationalists
The fog of war that obscured what was happening on the battlefield during the first weeks of the invasion has thinned somewhat. Military analysts initially relied on data from the Ukraine General Staff and Western intelligence services in part because they couldn’t find trustworthy Russian sources. Since the first days, however, Russian nationalists — both on the ground and on the sidelines — have emerged as a surprisingly useful source that makes parsing official Russian propaganda largely unnecessary.
I get an eerie feeling when the Institute for the Study of War, the think tank that provides some of the most detailed analysis of the battlefield situation, quotes someone called Boitsovy Kot Murz (literally, Purr the Fighting Cat) on the situation inside the Russian and pro-Russian separatist militaries. On the other hand, Murz — nationalist blogger Andrei Morozov — knows what he’s talking about and voices his criticism at no little personal risk. Igor Girkin, known by his nom de guerre Strelkov, also provides credible analysis of the Russian and pro-Russian troops’ troubles with poor command and logistics, as well as Moscow’s strategic failures. One of the key participants in the pro-Russian rebellion in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Girkin openly dreams of a role in the current war, but the Kremlin regards him as not loyal enough to get one. In part because of Girkin’s jealousy and frustration, his Telegram channel has been a must-read during this war.
Nationalists such as Morozov and Girkin root for a Russian victory with all their empire-loving hearts — but their deep hatred of the adversary is interlaced with an equally deep respect for Ukrainians’ fighting ability. The nationalists openly mistrust, often despise, the Putin top brass. They never believed in the blitzkrieg that Putin apparently thought he was about to carry out. They also have access to sources in various branches of the invading army, from the separatist militias to the Wagner private military company to regular units. Weighed against information coming from Ukrainian and Western sources, their insight and analysis provide much-needed balance, a job at which the Putin propaganda machine fails miserably.
The nationalists’ voices are also important because, in the event of a Russian defeat, they probably will be heard loudly; they might even end up as the country’s next revanchist driving force. Their sincerity will buy them popular support if the regime weakens and is unable to keep Russians in check by repression alone. Given that the remains of Russia’s liberal opposition largely have left the country since the war began, giving up any realistic claim on a major role in the post-Putin future, the likes of Girkin and his comrades inside and outside the invading army are the most credible non-regime force left. They are also in many ways more dangerous to Russia itself and its neighbors than Putin and his team of crooks and sycophants.
2. Underestimate neither side and don’t expect a compromise
In the first days of the war, most serious analysts believed a Ukrainian defeat was imminent. In later weeks, haphazard, overoptimistic, poorly planned Russian moves caused the Russian military to be seen as something of a paper tiger. By the 100-day point, however, both sides have proved worthy of each other militarily. The Russians showed they were able to learn from their mistakes: They moderated their unrealistic goals, centralized their operation’s command, focused resources in areas where they felt success was most likely, and improved logistics and coordination among branches. The Ukrainians have quickly converted their ferocious motivation to knowledge of the adversary, which has enabled some successful counterattacks. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, always a great communicator, has blossomed into a figure as heroic as he is skillful at messaging. Ukraine’s Infrastructure Ministry has done the impossible and kept transport running, the roads cleared, the blown-up bridges replaced and the military supplied.
The first 100 days of the conflict have shown that the war can go either way. Neither side will collapse or give up, and any concessions that may eventually be recorded in a peace deal will be hard-fought. Besides, the atrocities Russians have committed in Ukraine, from Bucha to Mariupol to Odesa, make it politically impossible for the Ukrainian leadership to offer any kind of compromise. Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, is probably unwilling to keep its end of any bargain; after the failure of the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, it no longer believes in deals. A negotiated outcome is possible only if one side is thoroughly beaten, and it will resemble that side’s capitulation more than a compromise.
The war that didn’t end in three days, three weeks or three months promises to stretch out for as long as a decisive victory for the invaders or the defenders may take. That can be a very long time, and even then the matter may not be settled, because the loser will be hell-bent on revenge.
3. Take off rose-colored glasses when looking West
There’s a wide gap between Western politicians’ and pundits’ perception of unprecedented unity in support of Ukraine and Ukrainians’ sober view of how much the West has been able to help.
Before the conflict began, the flow of Western weapons — mostly small arms, portable and nonlethal equipment — was sufficient for Putin to see a casus belli, to the extent he needed one, but far from enough to stop his invading force. Ukrainians have had to prove their mettle and keep proving it to receive heavier weapons. They are, however, receiving them more slowly than military necessity dictates, and the need to get trained in using the weapons systems slows the process further.
NATO has steered clear of anything that could be construed as direct intervention. Before the war, as the threat of a Russian invasion increased, it didn’t move to admit Ukraine — though in retrospect, granting Ukraine membership might have been one of the few preemptive moves capable of stopping Putin in his tracks. Now that Finland and Sweden are joining, Putin’s response is surprisingly toothless.
Since the invasion began, NATO has rejected Ukraine’s calls for a no-fly zone, showing Ukrainians as they fought off the full might of Russia’s conventional military that it was intimidated by Putin’s ritual threats of nuclear war. When it comes to actual fighting, Ukraine still stands alone in the blood and the mud, and this will long be remembered in victory or in defeat. The role of foot soldiers in the West’s proxy war with Russia is not one Ukrainians would willingly have chosen, and once peace is re-established, they will bear grudges — bigger ones against their less activist Western supporters such as Germany, France and neighboring Hungary, and smaller but still significant ones against the US, which has the decisive word on the extent of Western support.
All the loopholes in the seemingly severe Western sanctions regime will also be remembered; sure, the sanctions hurt, but they don’t hurt enough in the short and medium term that Putin would lose decisively or reconsider his options.
A Ukrainian defeat would be sure to lead to mutual recriminations and deeper rifts between the US and Europe, between Europe’s west and its east, and even within Eastern Europe between, on the one hand, the Baltics, Poland and the Czech Republic, which have gone above and beyond the call of duty in supporting Ukraine, and a far less enthusiastic Hungary. A Russian defeat would help mask the differences but probably lead to wrangling about sharing the financial burden of rebuilding Ukraine, and squabbling over who did how much during the conflict.
4. Keep thinking of Ukraine
The war has lasted well beyond the typical modern attention span. It’s hard to resist distractions that are, in large part, consequences of the war, too — the inflation caused by rising energy and food prices, the likely recession in Western economies, the stock market sell-off. By the time the war is over, few people outside Ukraine may be interested in its fate — in how much territory it may have to give up to Russia; in the enormous job of rebuilding bombed-out cities, industries and infrastructure; in the fate of the almost 14 million Ukrainians who have been forced to leave their homes. Despite its European geography, Ukraine risks shifting to the periphery of Western minds, as Syria has.
That would be the biggest mistake the rest of the world could make, not only because Putin and the nationalists who may come to rule Russia after him will keep obsessing about Ukraine. If support wanes, if Ukraine is pushed to make a humiliating deal, if the post-war restoration effort is anything short of the kind of investment the US made in Europe after World War II, then more invasions like Putin’s will be likely in every part of the world where a strongman nurtures territorial ambitions. The weaker sides in such conflicts will be strongly motivated to give up rather than fight as Ukraine has done, if only to avoid destruction on a similar scale. If Ukraine is not rewarded and compensated for its sacrifice, others in its position will be discouraged, fearful and uncertain.
Ukraine has fought alone, but helping it get back on its feet and prosper even if Russia grabs more territory is the world’s business. The country cannot rise again on its own. It may seem too early for the world to plan to help after the war — but planning might keep the world from forgetting the price Ukraine is paying now for its iron will to survive.
More from Bloomberg Opinion:
• Washington Can Bridge the Global Divide Over Ukraine: Editorial
• Europe’s New Era of Cooperation Might Not Last Long: Clive Crook
• The Rising Cost of Hitting Putin Where It Hurts: Lionel Laurent
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Leonid Bershidsky, formerly Bloomberg Opinion’s Europe columnist, is a member of the Bloomberg News Automation Team. He recently published Russian translations of George Orwell’s “1984” and Franz Kafka’s “The Trial.”
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